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D'Alessandro: Judge Levine

JUDGE LEVINE: A SURVEY OF
HIS MOST INFLUENTIAL
COURT OF APPEALS DECISIONS - 1993 TO 2002
The Touro Law Review would like to thank John Caher of
the New York Law Journal for his kind permission in allowing us
to expand on his research and article on Judge Howard A. Levine,
retired Court of Appeals judge, which appeared in the Law Journal
on December 2, 2002.
INTRODUCTION

Howard A. Levine retired from the Court of Appeals on
November 14, 2002, after spending nine years as one of seven
Justices on New York State's highest court.' Judge Levine, age
70, faced mandatory retirement as of January 1, 2003.2
Judge Levine, the son of two lawyers, grew up in
Schenectady, New York, where he attended the local public
schools. He received his undergraduate degree from Yale in
1953, as well as his law degree in 1956. 4 After graduating, he
in Manhattan, but soon moved back to
practiced briefly
5
Schenectady.
In 1961, Judge Levine worked as an assistant district
attorney, and in 1966 was elected, on the Republican ticket, to the
position of District Attorney; a position he retained until 1970. 6 In
1970, he was elected Schenectady County Family Court Judge,
where he served for ten years? He was then elected to the New
York Supreme Court, Schenectady County 8 for a very brief time
before he was promoted to the Appellate Division, Third
Department, where he served until his appointment to the Court of
Appeals. 9 Judge Levine, a moderate/conservative and self' John Caher, Self-Described 'Centrist' at Court of Appeal Retires, N.Y.L.J.,
Dec. 2, 2002, at 1.
21d.
3id.

4id.
5

id.
6 Caher,supra note 1.
7 Caher,supra note 1.
8 http://www.courts.state.ny.us/4jd/Schenectady/Supctjudges.html (last visited
May 15, 2003).

9 Caher, supra note 1.
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described centrist, 10 was appointed to the Court of Appeals in 1993
by Mario Cuomo, a Democrat and then Governor of New York
State." Presently, Judge Levine is senior counsel in the Albany
firm of Whiteman, Osterman and Hanna. 12
Judge Levine has been described by court scholars as more
inclined to side with the government than the individual, and to
defer to the legislature.' 3 However, Judge Levine's decisions
indicate a devotion to fair play and an aversion to abuse of power,
thereby making it difficult to pigeonhole his ideology into any one
category. In fact, the following review of Judge Levine's opinions
and dissents indicates no strict adherence to any ideology except
fair play and justice, which Judge Levine considered on a case-bycase basis. Judge Levine's background in both the district
attorney's office and the family court is evident in his opinions, but
not as taking any particular side of an issue, rather as
understanding the underlying principles ofjustice.
Judge Levine has indicated that Justice Harlan, known as a
dissenter on the Warren Court, is his judicial role model. It was
Justice Harlan's "very principled adjudications" that impressed
Judge Levine. 14 Judge Levine has stated that although he
ultimately agreed with many of the decisions of the Warren
Court, 15 it was Judge Levine's opinion that they may have "been
on firmer foundation had they followed his [Harlan's] approach of
incremental, common law law-making."' 6
Judge Levine's
philosophy, "Go a little slower, develop the law incrementally to
see if the changes work" is evident in his judicial opinions. 17
During his term in the appellate division, Justice Levine
wrote passionate dissents, hoping to influence the Court of
Appeals' final decisions.' 8 Although he has stated that being on
the court of last resort removes the primary reason for his dissents,
'0Caher,supra note 1.
"id.
22 N.Y.L.J., Jan. 15, 2003, at 1.
23 Caher, supra note 1.
14 Caher, supra note
1.
15 Caher,supra note 1.
16Caher,supra note 1.
17Caher,supra note 1.
1sCaher,supra note 1.
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and he does not dissent unless he feels very strongly against the
majority opinion, 19 he continued to speak his mind in dissents.
SEARCH AND SEIZURE

In Judge Levine's opinions and dissents in the area of
search and seizure, he did not adhere to the position of either the
prosecution or defense, but steadfastly adhered to the underlying
principles of fair play, reasonableness and objectivity, the
foundation of our search and seizure jurisprudence.
Judge Levine wrote the unanimous opinion of People v.
Banks in 1995.20 The defendant was convicted of criminal
possession of a controlled substance after being stopped on the
New York State Thruway for not wearing a seatbelt.
Once the
defendant stopped his car and exited, the police officer testified
that the defendant appeared very nervous. 22 The officer ran a
check on the defendant's license and registration, which revealed
no violations.23 The officer began to write up a ticket for a seatbelt
violation, and decided to search the interior of the car. 24 He radioed
for back up25 while the6defendant waited in his car, not being told
what caused the delay.The officer, upon giving defendant the seat belt ticket,
asked if there were any drugs or weapons in the vehicle. 27 The
defendant answered in the negative and told the officer he could
look for himself. The officer filled out a consent to search form,
which the defendant signed. 28 Upon searching the vehicle, the
officer found one-half kilogram of cocaine in the vehicle.29
Judge Levine, writing for the majority, held the search of
the interior of the car inappropriate, in that the search was "the
'9 Caher,supranote 1.

20 People v. Banks, 85 N.Y.2d 558, 650 N.E.2d 833, 626 N.Y.S.2d 986 (1995).
21Id. at 560, 650 N.E.2d at 834, 626 N.Y.S.2d at 987.
22 id.
2'Id.at 561, 650 N.E.2d at 834, 626 N.Y.S.2d at 987.
24 id.
25 Banks, 85 N.Y.2d at 561, 650 N.E.2d at 834, 626 N.Y.S.2d at 987.
26 id
27 Id.

28 id.
29 id.
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product of an inseparate illegal detention." 30 Although the officer
was justified in stopping the defendant for the seat belt infraction,
the length of time and circumstances of the detention were not
justified.3 ' In order for the search to be constitutional, Judge
Levine opined, it must relate to the circumstances which justified
the stop in the first instance, 32 which was the seat belt infraction.
Therefore, the court held that once the license and registration
check came back negative and the ticket was written, the initial
justification for the stop terminated, and the signed consent was
considered to be acquired by illegal detention.33
Also in 1995, Judge Levine wrote the dissent in People v.
Spencer,34 a four-to-three decision.
In Spencer, the police
answered the call of an assault victim.3 5 The police drove the
victim around the neighborhood for the purpose of locating the
suspect, who was the victim's boyfriend.3 ° The victim spotted the
defendant, a friend of the assailant, seated in a car. 37 The police
pursued him and pulled him over. 38 Upon peering into the vehicle,
the officers saw a plastic bag with what appeared to be vegetable
matter in it (which was, ultimately, found to be marijuana). 39 The
police officer also observed the butt of a gun protruding from
under the seat of the car.40 The defendant was charged with
criminal possession of a weapon and criminal possession of
marijuana. 41 The defendant claimed that the police stop of his
vehicle for the purpose of requesting information from him was an
43
unreasonable seizure42 under the Fourth Amendment.
30 Banks,
31

85 N.Y.2d at 561, 650 N.E.2d at 835, 626 N.Y.S.2d at 988.

id.

32 id.
33 id.

34 84 N.Y.2d 749, 646 N.E.2d 785, 622 N.Y.S.2d 483 (1995).
" Id. at 751, 646 N.E.2d at 786, 622 N.Y.S.2d at 484.
36 Id.

37 id.
"
Id. at 753, 646 N.E.2d at 787, 622 N.Y.S.2d at 485.
39
Spencer, 84 N.Y.2d at 751, 646 N.E.2d at 787, 622 N.Y.S.2d at 485.
40 id.
41id.
42 Id. at 752, 646 N.E.2d at 787, 622 N.Y.S.2d at 485.

43 U.S. CONST. amend. IV provides in pertinent part: "The right of the people
to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated .... "
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The majority agreed with the defendant, applying a
balancing test that the "reasonableness of a seizure must be judged
by balancing its intrusion on the Fourth Amendment interests of
the individual involved against its promotion of legitimate
governmental interests." 44 In applying this balancing test, the
majority concluded that the intrusion on the individual far
outweighed the governmental interest.45
Judge Levine, in his dissenting opinion, argued that the
state interest in gaining important information regarding the crime,
immediately after it took place, was more substantial than the
majority indicated,46 and the intrusiveness on defendant's privacy
interest was minimal.47 Further, Judge Levine reasoned that the
stop "was not arbitrary nor based on mere whim, caprice or idle
curiosity, ' 48 but was based on the victim's information that the
49
defendant would know where the suspect could be found.
Therefore, he reasoned the search, which was limited, was
reasonable under the facts of the case. °
Judge Levine opined that there were "specific, objective
51
facts" to justify the police stopping the vehicle, and given that the
police were in hot pursuit of a violent felon, less intrusive means,
53
52
such as surveillance of the defendant were not an alternative.
In 1999, Judge Levine wrote the majority opinion in In re
Muhammad F.,54 which held a traffic stop search unreasonable and
violative of the Fourth Amendment of the United States
Constitution.55 At issue was a course of action by New York City
police officers where plain clothes officers, in unmarked vehicles,

" Spencer, 84 N.Y.2d at 754, 646 N.E.2d at 788, 622 N.Y.S.2d at 486
(quoting People v. Scott, 63 N.Y.2d 518, 525, 473 N.E.2d 1, 3, 483 N.Y.S.2d

649, 651 (1984)).
45 id.
46 Id. at 760, 646 N.E.2d at 792, 622 N.Y.S.2d at 490
(Levine, J., dissenting).
47 id.
48
Id.(quoting People v. Spencer, 193 A.D.2d at 95, 602 N.Y.S.2d at 415).
49
Spencer, 84 N.Y.2d at 760, 646 N.E.2d at 792, 622 N.Y.S.2d at 490.
50
Id.at 761, 646 N.E.2d at 793, 622 N.Y.S.2d at 491.
"'
Id. at 764, 646 N.E.2d at 794, 622 N.Y.S.2d at 492.
52
Id. at 763, 646 N.E.2d at 794, 622 N.Y.S.2d at 492.
53Id.
14 94 N.Y.2d 136, 722 N.E.2d 45, 700
N.Y.S.2d 77 (1999).
5 Id. at 140, 722 N.E.2d at 46, 700 N.Y.S.2d at 78.
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stopped taxicabs in areas of high incidence of taxi robberies.5 6 The
policy was to pull over a predetermined percentage of taxis, but the
policy did not set any further guidelines. 57 It was, therefore, up to
the individual police officers to determine which taxis would be
stopped for what was ostensibly a "safety check." 58 If a passenger
was in the vehicle, the passenger would be asked to exit the
vehicle, and the officers would search the area under the seats. 59 In
the instant case, when the officers pulled over the taxi and shined
their light into the interior, they observed the defendant, a
passenger, acting suspiciously.60 A bag was found, containing
crack/cocaine, resulting in the defendant being "adjudicated a
juvenile delinquent for committing an act which, if committed by
constitute criminal possession of a controlled
an adult, would
61
substance."
Judge Levine, writing for the majority, applied the standard
set forth in Brown v. Texas, and held the search unconstitutional.
Brown sets forth a three-part balancing test to determine whether
such a stop is constitutional, balancing "the gravity of the public
concerns served by the seizure; the degree to which the seizure
advances the public interest; and the severity of the interference
with individual liberty." 63 In applying these factors, the court held
that although the "governmental interest in protecting victim-prone
taxicab drivers" was a valid governmental interest, no evidence
was produced that this type of stop was more effective than,
perhaps, a fixed checkpoint by uniformed officers in marked
cars.
The court also found there was no showing of the
unavailability of less intrusive or discretionary means to prevent
violent crime directed at the drivers.66 Therefore, these stops could
56
57

58

Id.
id.
Id.

N.Y.2d at 140, 722 N.E.2d at 46, 700 N.Y.S.2d at 78.
Id. at 141, 722 N.E.2d at 47, 700 N.Y.S.2d at 79.
id.
62443 U.S. 47 (1979).
63 Muhammad F., 94 N.Y.2d at 142, 722 N.E.2d at 47-48, 700 N.Y.S.2d at 7959 Muhammad F., 94
6601

80 (quoting Brown, 443 U.S. at 50-5 1).
64
6 Id. at 146, 722 N.E.2d at 50, 700 N.Y.S.2d at 82.
1ld. at 146-47, 722 N.E.2d at 50-51, 700 N.Y.S.2d at 82-83.
66id.
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not be established as reasonable under the three-part test. The
court further held the stops excessively and unjustifiably intrusive
considering the lack of any departmental standards as to vehicular
stops, and the fact that the decision of which vehicle to stop was at
the "standardless and unconstrained discretion of the official in the
field. 67
68
In the Court's 2001 decision of People v. Robinson,
Justice Levine wrote a strong dissent, disagreeing with the majority
that held the vehicular stop did not constitute a violation of Article
I, Section 12, of the New York State Constitution. 69 The police
policy was essentially the same as that of In re Muhammad F.70 In
Robinson, the police officers, in a marked police car, followed
taxicabs in an attempt to prevent robberies from occurring. 7' The
officers observed a car go through a red light and while pulling the
vehicle over, the officers saw a passenger looking back at the
officer's vehicle several times.72 One of the officers shined his
light into the vehicle and realized that the defendant, a passenger in
the livery cab, was wearing a bulletproof vest.73 The officer
ordered the defendant out of the cab, at which time the officer
observed a gun on the floor of the vehicle where the defendant was
seated.74 The defendant was charged with criminal possession of a
weapon, and unlawfully wearing a bulletproof vest. 75 The
defendant argued that the evidence should have been suppressed,
in that the officers used the traffic infraction as a pretext to search
76
him.
The majority adopted Whren v. United States77 as a matter
of state law. Whren essentially holds that as long as the police
67 Id. at 147-48, 722 N.E.2d at 51, 700 N.Y.S.2d at 83.
68 97 N.Y.2d 341, 767 N.E.2d 638, 741 N.Y.S.2d 147 (2001).
69

N.Y.CONST. art. 1, § 12 provides in pertinent part: "The right of the people

to be secure in their persons, houses papers and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated . ...
"
70 94 N.Y.2d at 136, 722 N.E.2d at 45, 700 N.Y.S.2d at 77.
7,Robinson, 97 N.Y.2d at 346, 767 N.E.2d at 640, 741 N.Y.S.2d at 149.
72

id.

71

Id. at 347, 767 N.E.2d at 640, 741 N.Y.S.2d at 149.

74 Id.
75Id.
76

Robinson, 97 N.Y.2d at 347, 767 N.E.2d at 640, 741 N.Y.S.2d at 149.
U.S. 806 (1996).

71 517
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have probable cause to believe a traffic violation has occurred, the
decision to stop the vehicle
is reasonable and not a violation of the
78
Fourth Amendment.
Justice Levine, in a strong dissent, argued that Whren
should not be adopted as a matter of state constitutional law. 79 He
reasoned that pretextual traffic stops, "stops that would not have
been made but for the aim of the police to accomplish an otherwise
unlawful investigative seizure or search ... is manifestly
insufficient to protect against arbitrary police conduct." 80 Judge
Levine stated that motor vehicle travel, the most regulated activity
engaged in by Americans, is a universal activity Americans engage
in outside of their homes. 8 1
Judge Levine reasoned the
combination of the numerous motor vehicle laws that could initiate
a stop, as well as the amount of time Americans spend in their cars
is a dangerous combination in the area of search and seizure
jurisprudence, and he believed that the ultimate consequence of
the adoption of the holding in Whren "is to allow the police to stop
vehicles in almost countless circumstances. When Whren is
coupled with today's holding, the Court puts tens of millions of
passengers at risk of arbitrary control by the police."8 3 Judge
Levine's view is further grounded in the possibility that "a
persevering police officer, armed only with a copy of the Vehicle
and Traffic Law and bent on subjecting a vehicle and its occupants
to an unjustified investigative stop, will ultimately be able to
accomplish that objective virtually at will."8 4
Judge Levine promulgated an objective standard, "would a
reasonable officer assigned to Vehicle and Traffic Law
enforcement in the seizing officer's department have made the stop
under the circumstances presented, absent a purpose to investigate
serious criminal activity of the vehicle's occupants." 85 Therefore,
in Judge Levine's view, there must be more than a traffic infraction
78

Robinson, 97 N.Y.2d at 348-49, 767 N.E.2d at 641, 741 N.Y.S.2d at 150

(citing Whren, 517 U.S. at 810).
79 Id. at 360, 767 N.E.2d at 650, 741 N.Y.S.2d at 159 (Levine, J., dissenting).
' 0 Id. at 363, 767 N.E.2d at 652, 741 N.Y.S.2d at 161.
S

Id.

id.
Robinson, 97 N.Y.2d at 366, 767 N.E.2d at 654, 741 N.Y.S.2d at 163.
84 Id. at 373, 767 N.E.2d at 660, 741 N.Y.S.2d at 169.
85 Id. at 371-72, 767 N.E.2d at 659-60, 741 N.Y.S.2d at 168-69.
82

83

https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol19/iss2/23

8

D'Alessandro: Judge Levine

2003

JUDGELEVINE4

459

to search a vehicle and use the fruits of that search in a criminal
proceeding against the defendant.86
Judge Levine wrote the majority opinion in the 1993 case
of In re Gregory M.,87 which, in effect, held that the threshold to
establish reasonable cause for a school search is a lower standard
than what is ordinarily constitutionally required.88 The defendant,
a high school student in the Bronx, was asked to put his book bag
on a metal shelf as he entered the school. 89 As he did, a nearby
security guard heard a metallic thud and, in response, ran his hands
over the outside of the bag feeling the shape of a9 gun.
It was
discovered that the bag contained a small hand gun. '
Judge Levine, in writing for the Court, held that to
determine the validity of a school search, there must be "a
balancing of basic personal rights against urgent social
necessities." 92 The Court held that defendant's expectation of
privacy was minimal with regard to someone touching the outside
of his school bag; 93 however, the state interest in keeping weapons
out of the New York City schools was "a governmental interest of
the highest urgency." 94 In light of this balancing test, the Court
held the search reasonable in that a "lesser standard than
reasonable suspicion" applied to the feeling of the outside of the
defendant's back pack. 95
ACONSTITUTIONAL

RIGHTS OF PRISONERS

In Judge Levine's opinions with regard to prisoners' rights,
he has held that interrogation of an inmate is not a per se custodial

at 374, 767 N.E.2d at 661, 741 N.Y.S.2d at 170.
82 N.Y.2d 588, 627 N.E.2d 500, 606 N.Y.S.2d 579 (1993).
88 Id. at 591, 627 N.E.2d at 591, 606 N.Y.S.2d at 580.
'6Id.

87

'9Id. at 590, 627 N.E.2d at 590, 606 N.Y.S.2d at 580.
9 Id.
91Id.

Gregory M., 82 N.Y.2d at 592, 627 N.E.2d at 502, 606 N.Y.S.2d at 581
(quoting People v. Scott, 34 N.Y.2d 483, 315 N.E.2d 466, 358 N.Y.S.2d 403
(1974)).
92

93 Id.

Id. at 593, 627 N.E.2d at 502, 606 N.Y.S.2d at 581.
9'Id. at 594, 627 N.E.2d at 503, 606 N.Y.S.2d at 582.
94
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interrogation, and that a prison program mandating Alcoholic's
Anonymous attendance violated the Establishment Clause.
A Judge Levine wrote the majority opinion in People v.
Ails, which held that interrogating an inmate in a penal institution
is not a per se custodial interrogation, 97 and therefore, does not
require Miranda warnings. 98 Miranda warnings grew out of the
99
United States Supreme Court decision in Miranda v. Arizona
where the Court held that with respect to statements made by a
defendant, "'the prosecution may not use statements, whether
exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation
of the defendant unless it demonstrates the use of procedural
safeguards effective to secure the privilege against selfincrimination."' °
The Court further held that "[b]y custodial
interrogation we mean questioning initiated by law enforcement
officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise
deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way."'' 1 The
Supreme Court reasoned that custodial interrogation was
inherently coercive, and the individual had to be 0protected
from
2
atmosphere.
an
such
in
herself
or
him
incriminating
.In the instant case, the defendant, Alls, was an inmate in a
New York State correctional facility.' 0 3 He was involved in an
incident in the facility which led to his indictment for sodomy in
the first degree and assault in the second degree.1°4 A correctional
officer questioned Alls, alone in an empty basement room of the
facility, without first administering Miranda warnings. 05 Alls
claimed that because an inmate is not free to leave the facility,
"any questioning of the prisoner is per se custodial interrogation,
requiring Miranda warnings. 106 The court held that for Miranda
warnings to be necessary, there must be an added constraint, so
96

83 N.Y.2d 94, 629 N.E.2d 1018, 608 N.Y.S.2d 139 (1993).

9 Id. at 97, 629 N.E.2d at 1019, 608 N.Y.S.2d at 140.

98 Id.
99 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
'oo Id. at 444.
101 Id.
102

id.

103Alls,

83 N.Y.2d at 96, 629 N.E.2d at 1018, 608 N.Y.S.2d at 139.

104id.

Id. at 97, 629 N.E.2d at 1019, 608 N.Y.S.2d at 140.
I5
106 id.
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that the "inmate reasonably believes there has been a restriction on
his or her 10 freedom
over and above that of ordinary
7
confinement."'
Judge Levine wrote the majority opinion in In re David
Griffin, 0 8 which held that the Establishment Clause of the United
States Constitution's First Amendment 10 9 was violated by a prison
policy that denied a prisoner's family visitation privileges for
refusing to attend Alcoholic's Anonymous meetings, which was
the only alcohol and drug rehabilitation program offered in the
prison. 110 The court held that the religious-orientated practices of
Alcoholic's
Anonymous
"necessarily
entail[s]
religious
1
1
exercise." '
Such mandatory attendance violates the
Establishment Clause due to the prison's exercising coercive
power to advance religion, taking into account the severe
consequence of non-attendance.112
DEATH PENALTY STATUTE

Judge Levine, writing for the majority, addressed the New
York State death penalty statute in his majority opinion in
Francois v. Dolan,' 3 where the court held that a defendant in a
death penalty case has no legal right to enter a plea of guilty,
which, in effect, would result in no possibility of the death
sentence. 114 The defendant, Francois, was indicted for eight counts
of murder in the first degree, eight counts of murder in the second5
second degree assault."
degree, and one count of attempted
116
guilty.
not
Francois entered a plea of

107Id. at

100, 629 N.E.2d at 1021, 608 N.Y.S.2d at 142.
'o' 88 N.Y.2d 674, 673 N.E.2d 98, 649 N.Y.S.2d 903 (1996).
'09

U.S. CONST. amend. I provides in pertinent part: "Congress shall make no

law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof ..
1:0 Griffin, 88 N.Y.2d at 677, 673 N.E.2d at 99, 649 N.Y.S.2d at 904.
'I Id. at 686, 673 N.E.2d at 105, 649 N.Y.S.2d at 910.
112 id.
95 N.Y.2d 33, 731 N.E.2d 614, 709 N.Y.S.2d 898 (2000).
Id. at 35, 731 N.E.2d at 614, 709 N.Y.S.2d at 898.
" Id. at 35, 731 N.E.2d at 615,709 N.Y.S.2d at 899.
116 id.
113
14
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Under New York State law, the district attorney has 120
days from the date of defendant's arraignment to serve a notice of
intent to seek the death penalty." 17 Prior to the death penalty notice
being filed, the defendant offered to plead guilty to the indictment;
however, the District Attorney opposed the plea, and filed the
required notice to seek the death penalty. 18 The county court
judge refused to accept the defendant's plea of guilty. 119 The
defendant sought an order directing the county court to entertain
his guilty plea of the entire indictment, claiming that a defendant in
all cases, including capital0 crimes, has an absolute right to plead
guilty prior to the verdict.12
The Court of Appeals held a capital defendant does not
have such a right.
The outcome of such a right, in light of the
structure of New York's death penalty statute would negate any
possibility of the defendant actually receiving the death penalty.
New York's statute mandates "a jury trial for the guilt-adjudication
stage and then, upon conviction, there is a mandated second
sentencing proceeding before a jury to determine whether the
penalty imposed will be death or life imprisonment without
parole."' 23 As the guilty plea renders the jury determination moot,
so too would it render the possibility of a death sentence moot.
117N.Y.

CRIM. PROC. LAW § 250.40(2) (McKinney 2003) provides:

sentence of death may not be imposed upon a defendant
convicted of murder in the first degree unless, pursuant to
subdivision two of this section, the people file with the

1. A

court and serve upon the defendant a notice of intent to
seek the death penalty.
2. In any prosecution in which the people seek a sentence of
death, the people shall, within one hundred twenty days of
the defendant's arraignment upon an indictment charging

the defendant with murder in the first degree, serve upon
the defendant and file with the court in which the
indictment is pending a written notice of intention to seek
the death penalty. For good cause shown the court may
extend the period for service and filing of the notice.
118 Francois,95 N.Y.2d at 37, 731 N.E.2d at 616, 709 N.Y.S.2d at 900.
119
Id.

120id.
121 Id.
122

Id. at 37-38, 731 N.E.2d at 616, 709 N.Y.S.2d at 900.

Francois,95 N.Y.2d at 36, 731 N.E.2d at 615, 709 N.Y.S.2d at 899 (citing
N.Y. CRiM. PROC. LAW § 400.27).
123
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Judge Levine, writing for the majority, cautioned that to
rule that a defendant does have a legal right to plead guilty in such
a case "would inevitably result, in the most heinous or high profile
cases, in an unseemly race to the courthouse between defense and
prosecution to see whether a guilty plea or notice of intent to seek
the death penalty will be filed first."' 124 Such a race, in the court's
view, is not only unacceptable, but would "undeniably preclude the
to seek
thorough, fully deliberative decision making on whether 25
intended.1
has
Legislature
the
which
.,"
.
the death penalty.
One year later, in 2001, Judge Levine again wrote the
majority opinion in People v. Edwards,126 where the defendant was
indicted on one count of murder in the first degree, murder in the
second degree, and criminal possession of a weapon in the second
degree. 127 The prosecution filed a timely notice of intent to seek
the death penalty. 28 In the month following, the prosecution and
defendant entered into a plea agreement, wherein the defendant
would receive a sentence of twenty-five years to life in exchange
129
for his cooperation in the prosecution of his co-defendants.
After the defendant's guilty plea had been entered, but
before sentencing, the New York Court of Appeals struck the plea
provisions from New York's death penalty statute. 130 The repealed
provisions had permitted a defendant, who had a death penalty
notice pending, to enter a guilty plea of first degree murder with
the consent of the prosecution and permission of the court, and
only when the a reed upon sentence was life without parole or a
term of years.' 3 The court struck these provisions, fearing a
constitutional defect, in that the act "created a two-tiered penalty
structure that impermissibly burdened capital defendants' Fifth
Amendment rights against self-incrimination' 32 and Sixth
124 Id. at 39, 731 N.E.2d at 617, 709 N.Y.S.2d at 901.

125 Id.
12696 N.Y.2d 445, 754 N.E.2d 169, 729 N.Y.S.2d 410 (2001).
127Id. at 448, 754 N.E.2d at 170, 729 N.Y.S.2d at 411.
128 id.
129

id.
30 Id. at 449, 754 N.E.2d at 170, 729 N.Y.S.2d at 411.

Edwards, 96 N.Y.2d at 449, 754 N.E.2d at 170, 729 N.Y.S.2d at 411.
...
132U.S. CONST. amend. V provides in pertinent part:
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or other
infamous crime unless on a presentment or indictment of a
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Amendment rights to trial by jury' 33 by limiting imposition of a
death sentence exclusively to defendants asserting those rights by
insisting upon a jury trial.' 34 In response to this decision, the
his guilty plea,' 35
defendant in the instant case moved to withdraw
136
and the county court denied the motion.
The Court of Appeals held that the defendant entered an
entirely valid plea under the law then existing,' 37 in spite of the
38
fact that the law was defective at the time the plea was entered.
Therefore, the court held defendant's plea, even if only entered
because of fear of exposure to the death penalty, did not violate his
39
Fifth or Sixth Amendment rights. 1
CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT

In People v. Thompson, 14 a seventeen year-old female
defendant was sentenced to not less than fifteen years and not more
than twenty-five years for the sale of two ounces of cocaine to an
undercover police officer. 14 1 The trial court concluded that in this
case, even the minimum mandatory sentence constituted cruel and
unusual punishment under both the Eighth Amendment to the

Grand Jury... nor shall any person be subject for the same
offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself,
nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law ...
133 U.S. CONST. amend. VI provides in pertinent part:
"In all criminal
prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an
impartial jury of the State .... "
'34 Edwards, 96 N.Y.2d at 449, 754 N.E.2d at 171,
729 N.Y.S.2d at 412.
135

136

131
3

18

id.
id.
Id. at 454, 754 N.E.2d at 174, 729 N.Y.S.2d at 415.
id.

Edwards, 96 N.Y.2d at 454, 754 N.E.2d at 174, 729 N.Y.S.2d at 415.
83 N.Y.2d 477, 633 N.E.2d 1074, 611 N.Y.S.2d 470 (1994).
141 Id. at 479, 633 N.E.2d at 1075. 611
N.Y.S.2d at 471.
139
140
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142 and Article I, Section 5 of the New
United States Constitution,
143
Constitution.
York State
Judge Levine, writing for the court, gave deference to the
legislature, although acknowledging that the "mandatory sentences
144
for drug offenses are relatively severe, but not irrationally so."
The court held that for a sentence to be considered cruel and
inhumane, the United States Supreme Court has held that there
must be "gross disproportionality" between the sentence of
imprisonment and the crime to violate the Eighth Amendment's
Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause. 145
The court held that "the Legislature may constitutionally
define criminal punishments without giving the courts any
sentencing discretion."' 146 The court further held that the "selling
of narcotic drugs represents a grave offense of the first
magnitude,"' 147 and that compared to the sentences of other crimes
within the state, or in comparing other states' narcotics sentences
to New York's, "the mandatory sentences for drug offenses are
relatively severe, but not irrationally so, given the epidemic
14 8
dimensions of the problem."'
RIGHT TO A SPEEDY TRIAL

In People v. Vernace, 1.49 the six judge majority held that a
fourteen year delay in the prosecution of a murder suspect was not
unreasonable, and the prosecution could proceed. 150 The majority
reasoned that although the delay was extensive, the nature of the
142

U.S. CONST. amend. V111 provides: "Excessive bail shall not be required,

nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishment inflicted."
143N.Y. CONST. art. 1, § 5 provides: "Excessive bail shall not be required nor
excessive fines imposed, nor shall cruel and unusual punishments be inflicted,
nor shall witnesses be unreasonably detained."
144 Thompson, 83 N.Y.2d at 482, 633 N.E.2d at 1077, 611 N.Y.S.2d at 473
(citing People v. Broadie, 37 N.Y.2d 100, 117, 332 N.E.2d 338, 345, 371
N.Y.S.2d 471, 480-81 (1975).
145 Id. at 479, 633 N.E.2d at 1076, 611 N.Y.S.2d at 472 (citing Harmelin v.
Michigan, 501 U.S. 957 (1991)).
146Id. at 482, 633 N.E.2d at 1077, 611 N.Y.S.2d at 473.
147
148

id.
Id. (citing Broadie, 37 N.Y.2d 100, 332 N.E.2d 338, 371 N.Y.S.2d 471).

49 96 N.Y.2d 886, 756 N.E.2d 66, 730 N.Y.S.2d 778 (2001).

ISo

Id. at 888, 756 N.E.2d at 67, 730 N.Y.S.2d at 779.
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underlying charge
did not "demonstrate undue prejudice to the
51
defendant."'
Judge Levine, in his solitary dissent, stated that the New
York Court of Appeals has viewed "an unjustified, protracted preindictment delay in prosecution... as a deprivation of a
defendant's state constitutional right to due process, without
requiring a showing of actual prejudice."'' 52 In the case of a
prolonged delay, the prosecution must establish good cause for the
delay. 15 3 In Judge Levine's dissent, he opined not only did the
prosecution fail to establish good cause for the delay, but "the
evidence points only to complete prosecutorial inertia and
inattention . ,,54
RIGHT TO COUNSEL

In 1997, Judge Levine wrote the unanimous opinion in
People v. Cohen, 155 holding that a criminal defendant's right to
counsel was violated when the police, who knew the defendant
was represented by counsel in a prior related crime, interrogated
him on a subse uent crime, but intermingled questions regarding
the first crime.
The court held the interrogation "actually
entailed an infringement of the suspect's State constitutional right
to counsel
by impermissible questioning on the represented
7
'5

crime."'

The defendant, Cohen, was implicated in the murder of a
store clerk at a Citgo gas station. 158 The weapon used in the crime
was stolen from a nearby garage, and an informant advised police
that the defendant was' one of the three people who had stolen the
1 59
gun and told the informant of their plan to rob the Citgo station.
The defendant retained counsel with respect to the gun theft. 60
151 id.
152Id. at 889, 756 N.E.2d at 69, 730 N.Y.S.2d at 781 (Levine, J., dissenting).
153 id.

Vernace, 96 N.Y.2d at 890, 756 N.E.2d at 69-70, 730 N.Y.S.2d at 781-82.
15'90 N.Y.2d 632, 687 N.E.2d 1313, 665 N.Y.S.2d 30 (1997).
156Id. at 642, 687 N.E.2d at 1319, 665 N.Y.S.2d at 36.
'Id. at 640, 687 N.E.2d at 1317, 665 N.Y.S.2d at 34.
Ild. at 635, 687 N.E.2d at 1314, 665 N.Y.S.2d at 31.
154

159 Id.
160 Cohen,

90 N.Y.2d at 635, 687 N.E.2d at 1315, 665 N.Y.S.2d at 32.
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Subsequently, the police questioned the defendant about the
Citgo robbery and murder, and intermingled questions about the
garage robbery. 161 Defendant's counsel was not present, and the
62
defendant fully incriminated himself in the robbery/murder.
The court held there was an interference with an existing
attorney/client relationship of which the officers were personally
aware, 163 and that the officers' questions regarding the garage
crime "was designed to add pressure on the defendant to
confess"' 164 to the subsequent crime.
CONFRONTATION CLAUSE

In In re Edwin L., 165 the majority held that where a juvenile
violated the conditions of an adjournment in contemplation of
dismissal, there was no confrontation clause defect in the court
66
producing only hearsay testimony against the minor-defendant.
The alleged violations were testified to by a social worker at the
minor's hearing, who testified from reports, but had no personal
knowledge of the information contained therein. 167 In his dissent,
Judge Levine reasoned that "procedural
due process
protections.., include a hearing at which the juvenile has the right
to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses."' 68 He further
reasoned that the agency had the burden to prove the violations
occurred, 169 and that Edwin L's interest, in being released from the
court's supervision was a "constitutionally significant liberty
interest."' 7 Therefore, the fact that the hearing rested solely on
hearsay evidence, without finding good cause for dispensing with
confrontation, "violated his right to procedural due process.
161

Id. at 638, 687 N.E.2d at 1316, 665 N.Y.S.2d at 33.

162

id.

163

Id. at 641, 687 N.E.2d at 1318, 665 N.Y.S.2d at 35.

Id. at 642, 687 N.E.2d at 1319, 665 N.Y.S.2d at 36.
88 N.Y,2d 593, 671 N.E.2d 1247, 648 N.Y.S.2d 850 (1996).
166 Id. at 597, 671 N.E.2d at 1248, 648 N.Y.S.2d at 851.
167 Id. at 599, 671 N.E.2d at 1249, 648 N.Y.S.2d at 852.
161 Id. at 607, 671 N.E.2d at 1253, 648 N.Y.S.2d at 856 (Levine, J.,
'64
165

dissenting).
169 Id. at 608, 671 N.E.2d at 1254, 648 N.Y.S.2d at 857.
170 Edwin L., 88 N.Y.2d at 613, 671 N.E.2d at 1258, 648 N.Y.S.2d at 861.
171' Id. at 616, 671 N.E.2d at 1259, 648 N.Y.S.2d at 862.
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EQUAL PROTECTION

Judge Levine wrote the dissent in In re Cahill,172 wherein
the majority held that a dentist's office is a place of public
accommodation. 173 As such, the office falls within New York
Executive Law Section 296(2)(a), 174 which holds discrimination
unlawful "if a place of public accommodation denies its
accommodations to any person on the basis of race, creed, color,
national origin, sex, or disability or marital status."' 175 'The dentist
in the instant case denied treatment to a patient he perceived as
being at risk for HIV. 176 The court held such discriminatory
practices were unlawful under the civil rights law of New York
State, in that "persons within the reach of the statute
may not pick
' 77
and choose those against whom they discriminate."'

172 89 N.Y.2d 14, 674 N.E.2d 274, 651 N.Y.S.2d 344 (1996).
173 Id. at 21, 674 N.E.2d at 277, 651 N.Y.S.2d
at 347.
174 N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 296(2)(a) (McKinney 2002)
provides:
It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person,
being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent,
agent or employee of any place of public accommodation,
resort or amusement, because of the race, creed, color,
national origin, sexual orientation, sex, or disability or marital
status of any person, directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold
from or deny to such person any of the accommodations,
advantages, facilities or privileges thereof, including the
extension of credit, or, directly or indirectly, to publish,
circulate, issue, display, post or mail any written or printed
communication, notice or advertisement, to the effect that any
of the accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges of
any such place shall be refused, withheld from or denied to
any person on account of race, creed, color, national origin,
sexual orientation, sex, or disability or marital status, or that
the patronage or custom thereat of any person of or purporting
to be of any particular race, creed, color, national origin,
sexual orientation, sex or marital status, or having a disability
is unwelcome, objectionable or not acceptable, desired or
solicited.
'.. Cahill, 89 N.Y.2d at 23, 674 N.E.2d at 279, 651 N.Y.S.2d at 348.
76
1 Id. at 18, 674 N.E.2d at 275, 651 N.Y.S.2d at 345.
177 Id. at 23, 674 N.E.2d at 278, 651 N.Y.S.2d at
348.
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a
Judge Levine disagreed that a dentist's office was within178
of public accommodation, resort or amusement,"

lamenting that to include the dentist's office in the class would
"result in an explosive increase in the jurisdiction of the State
Division of Human Rights.' ' 179 Judge Levine stated that although
"the private practices of dentists or medicine is important to the
public, traditionally it lacks that openness of access by the general
public that has been an essential characteristic of a place of public
accommodation."' 80 Judge Levine reasoned that to read the statute
so broadly, the court brought within the statute businesses which
the legislature did not intend to include, 181 and, in so doing, the
the law "without the benefit of a legislative
majority rewrote
' 82
enactment."'
Furthermore, in In re Clara C,183 although Judge Levine
concurred in the decision of the court, he would have taken the
decision one step further and declared that the statute at issue
"unconstitutionally denied the child... right to the equal
(U.S. Constitution Fourteenth
protection of the laws.
1 84
and New York Constitution Article 1, Section
Amendment
185).9186

An unwed mother and the putative father entered into a
516.187
support agreement pursuant to Family Court Act Section
dissenting).
178 Id. at 25, 674 N.E.2d at 279, 651 N.Y.S.2d at 349 (Levine, J.,
I7 at 24-25, 674 N.E.2d at 278-79, 651 N.Y.S.2d at 348-49.
Id.
Cahill,89 N.Y.2d at 26, 674 N.E.2d at 280, 651 N.Y.S.2d at 350.
181Id. at 27, 674 N.E.2d at 280, 651 N.Y.S.2d at 350.
180

182
id.
18396

N.Y.2d 244, 750 N.E.2d 1068, 727 N.Y.S.2d 20 (2001).

amend. XIV provides in pertinent part: "No State shall make
or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens
of the United States."
185N.Y. CONST. art. 1, § 11 provides:
No person shall be denied the equal protection of the laws of
this state or any subdivision thereof. No person shall, because
of race, color, creed or religion, be subjected to any
discrimination in his civil rights by any other person or by any
firm, corporation, or institution, or by the state or any agency
or subdivision of the state.
186 Clara C., 96 N.Y.2d at 251, 750 N.E.2d at 1073, 727 N.Y.S.2d at 25
(Levine, J., concurring).
187 N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 516 (McKinney 2003) provides:
184U.S. CONST.
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Section 516 applies only to non-marital children and holds that
once the parties enter into a binding support agreement, which has
been approved by a court, the agreement bars any future "remedies
of the mother or child for the support and education of the
child.' ' 188 Twelve years after the agreement was signed, the mother
the agreement, in light of the child's
applied to the court to modify
89
needs.1
educational
current
The majority held that based on the facts, there was a flaw
in the original proceeding, in that the family court never made a
determination as to the agreement's adequacy, as required by the
statute, and, therefore, the mother could proceed with her family
The majority
court petition for an increase in support.'1°
consciously chose not to address the constitutionality of Section
516 "[b]ecause a compelling nonconstitutional ground resolves this
appeal, we refrain, at this time, from addressing the constitutional
issues raised."' 191
However, Judge Levine, in his concurring opinion was not
as restrained as the majority. He reasoned that Family Law
Section 516 violates the Equal Protection Clause of the United
States Constitution192 and Article 1 Section 11 of the New York
Constitution. He reasoned that the Act "treat[s] the support of non(a) An agreement or compromise made by the mother or
by some authorized person on behalf of either the mother

or child concerning the support of either is binding upon
the mother and child only when the court determines that
adequate provision has been made and is fully secured
said agreement or compromise.
and approves
(b) No agreement or compromise under this section shall
be approved until notice and opportunity to be heard are
given to the public welfare official of the county, city or

town where the mother resides or the child is found.
(c) The complete performance of the agreement or
compromise, when so approved, bars other remedies of

the mother or child for the support and education of the
child.
118 Clara C., 96 N.Y.2d at 249, 750 N.E.2d at 1071, 727 N.Y.S.2d at 23.
189 Id. at 248, 750 N.E.2d at 1070, 727 N.Y.S.2d at 22.
'90 Id. at 250, 750 N.E.2d at 1072, 727 N.Y.S.2d at 24.
191Id.

192

U.S. CONST. amend. XIV provides in pertinent part: "No State shall make

or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens
of the United States."
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marital children, whose mothers have entered into court approved
compromises of paternity suits, differently from the support rights
of children born of married parents."' 93 The non-marital child,
under Section 512, is forever barred after the agreement is entered
into, from "seeking either an initial order of support through
paternity proceedings.., or from seeking modification of the court
approved agreement ... 194 Such disparate treatment of this class
of individuals, Judge Levine wrote, "triggers the intermediate level
95
of scrutiny."1
Judge Levine opined that the state's interest of "reducing
and disposing of litigation in the courts through settlement
agreements ... [and] ensurling] that the child will not be without
support from his father ' 19 as well as "avoiding the vagaries of
paternity litigation"' 97 are no longer viable in light of developed
technology in determining paternity. Therefore, Judge Levine
believed the state interest was not substantial. 98 He further
reasoned that "[t]here is little apparent reason apart from purely
invidious discrimination, why the state's general interest in settling
lawsuits with finality should be greater in the case of a non-marital
child." 199
Apparently the New York State Assembly agreed with
Judge Levine's position. A bill to repeal Section 516 of the Family
2
Court Act is presently before the New York State Legislature. 00
CAMPAIGN FUNDING

In In re Robert L. Schulz, 201 Judge Levine wrote the
majority opinion, which held that a newsletter, The Voice of the
'9'

Clara C., 96 N.Y.2d at 253, 750 N.E.2d at 1074, 727 N.Y.S.2d at 26.
254, 750 N.E.2d at 1075, 727 N.Y.S.2d at 27.

"94Id. at
195 Id.

'96

Id. at 255, 750 N.E.2d at 1077, 727 N.Y.S.2d at 29.

'9

Id. at 256, 750 N.E.2d at 1077, 727 N.Y.S.2d at 29.
Clara C., 96 N.Y.2d at 257, 750 N.E.2d at 1077, 727 N.Y.S.2d at 29.

'9'

199 Id.

200 A04284,

2003 Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (NY 2003) states in pertinent part:
Repeals section 516 of the family court act which provides for court approval of
a written agreement or compromise for child support between a putative father
and a mother or person on behalf of the child, which, when so approved, bars
other remedies for child support.
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New, New York, sent to the public at the direction of Governor
Cuomo 202 on the eve of the 1992 presidential campaign, was in
violation of 2Article
VII, Section 8(1)203 of the New York State
04
Constitution.
In writing for the majority, Judge Levine opined that
although "the newsletter contained a substantial amount of factual
information which would have been of assistance to the electorate.
,205 the newsletter also contained criticism of the Bush
administration and republicans with regard to welfare reform, a
primary issue in the campaign. 20 6 Therefore, the newsletter went
beyond disseminating information to the electorate, but was "an
unequivocal promotion of a partisan political position," 2°7
and
20 8
could not be "prepared and disseminated at public expense."
DEFAMATION ON THE INTERNET

Judge Levine wrote the majority opinion in Firth v. New
which held that for purposes of the statute of limitations,
the single publication rule is applicable to defamatory statements
posted on the Internet. 210 The court reasoned that to hold
otherwise would "implicate an even greater potential for endless
York, 20 9

86 N.Y.2d 225, 654 N.E.2d 1226, 630 N.Y.S.2d 978 (1995).
Governor Cuomo appointed Judge Levine to the Court of Appeals.
203 N.Y. CONST. art. VII § (8)(1) provides:
The money of the state shall not be given or loaned to or in aid
of any private corporation or association, or private
201

202

undertaking; nor shall the credit of the state be given or loaned

to or in aid of any individual, or public or private corporation
or association, or private undertaking, but the foregoing
provisions shall not apply to any fund or property now held or
which may hereafter be held by the state for educational,
mental health or mental retardation purposes.
204 Schulz' 86 N.Y.2d at 235, 654 N.E.2d at 1231, 630 N.Y.S.2d at 983.
205

id.

206 id.
207 Id. at
208
209
210

236, 654 N.E.2d at 1231, 630 N.Y.S.2d at 983.

id.
98 N.Y.2d 365, 775 N.E.2d 463, 747 N.Y.S.2d 69 (2002).

Id. at 370, 775 N.E.2d at 466, 747 N.Y.S.2d at 72.
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retriggering of the statute of limitations, multiplicity of suits and
harassment of defendants." 2"
CONCLUSION

This brief summary of Judge Levine's opinions and
dissents demonstrates a non-partisan jurist, a jurist not influenced
by political pressure nor political "correctness," but rather
influenced by fundamental fairness in a changing modem society.
Judge Levine's jurisprudence leaves the foundation on which the
Constitution was built intact, and uses it to support his wellreasoned decisions.

211 id.
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